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Abstract
Using a New Keynesian framework, this paper compares the e¤ects on the
welfare of optimal monetary policies under commitment and discretion, and
examines the consequences of the presence of in‡ation persistence. A pol-
icy under commitment generates a better weighted average of the variances
of output and in‡ation (“dynamic gains”), and eliminates the in‡ationary
bias. Commitment usually delivers a lower variance of in‡ation and a higher
variance of output than those under discretion. The e¤ect of the presence
of in‡ation persistence on the dynamic gains from commitment is somehow
surprising: the bene…ts are increasing in the degree of in‡ation persistence
for moderate levels of persistence. On the other hand, in‡ation persistence
reduces the in‡ationary bias. Furthermore, under “restricted commitment”,
where the solution is restricted to be within the same family of rules of the
discretionary case, the gains are substantially inferior to those from commit-
ment.
Keywords: optimal monetary policy, commitment, discretion, in‡ation
persistence
JEL Classi…cation: E31, E52
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31 Introduction
Using a New Keynesian framework, this paper compares optimal monetary policies
conducted with and without commitment, and examines the e¤ects of the presence
of in‡ation persistence. Without commitment—also called the discretionary case—
the central bank is allowed to reoptimize every period, whereas, under commitment,
it optimizes once and for all. The paper addresses the e¤ects of these policies on
the welfare, which is measured by a loss function that penalizes deviations of output
gap and in‡ation rate from their targets. The main results are as follows. A policy
under commitment generates a superior welfare compared to that under discretion.
It eliminates the in‡ationary bias, and results in a better weighted average of the
variances of output and in‡ation. Commitment usually delivers a lower variance of
in‡ation rate than that under discretion, but results in a higher variance of output
for a large range of parameter values. The relative importance of the gains coming
from thevariability of outputand in‡ation(“dynamicgains”)in comparison tothose
from the elimination of the in‡ationary bias depends signi…cantly on the parameter
values.
Thee¤ectofthepresenceofin‡ationpersistence on thegains fromcommitmentis
somehowsurprising. Since thebene…ts under commitment stem fromthe presence of
forward-looking variables, we could expect that the presence of in‡ation persistence
would reduce those gains. Nevertheless, for moderate levels of in‡ation persistence,
thedynamic gains from commitment aregreater than those veri…ed withoutin‡ation
persistence. On the other hand, the presence of in‡ation persistence reduces the
in‡ationary bias, decreasing the relative bene…ts from commitment.
Furthermore, the paper also considers optimal policies under “restricted com-
mitment”, where the solution is restricted to be within the same family of rules of
the discretion solution. The gains are signi…cantly inferior to those coming from
commitment.
The bene…ts from policies under commitment have been explored since Kydland
and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). This literature generally uses
4a Lucas-type aggregate supply curve, in which prices are ‡exible and output is
positively related to the di¤erence between realized and expected current in‡ation
rate. Underdiscretion themonetaryauthority attempts to expand outputbeyondits
natural ratebecauseof the presence of somedistortionsin theeconomy, such astaxes
or imperfect competition. Nevertheless, the private agents recognize this incentive,
incorporating itintheirin‡ationaryexpectations, which leads toan equilibrium with
output at its natural rate and the in‡ation rate above the target—the in‡ationary
bias. In contrast, if the central bank can commit itself, the in‡ationary bias is
eliminated and the society is better o¤. In this framework, however, policies under
commitment do not yield additional gains.
On the other hand, in the absence of commitment, the society is better o¤
appointing a central banker with more in‡ation aversion than that of the society
(Rogo¤, 1985). With a more conservative central banker, the in‡ationary bias is
reduced, but at a cost of some stabilization bias.
Di¤erently from these models, which assume price ‡exibility, this paper draws
on a recent literature that has compared policies under commitment and discretion
using a New Keynesian framework based on time-dependent sticky prices (Clarida,
Galí, and Gertler, 1999; Svensson and Woodford, 1999; Woodford, 1999a, 1999c).
According to the New Keynesian Phillips curve, the current in‡ation rate depends
on the current output gap and expected in‡ation rate (Roberts, 1995).
Nevertheless, the empirical relevance of the presence of persistence in in‡ation
has been emphasized by some authors, such as Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Fuhrer
(1997). They suggest a hybrid form for the aggregate supply curve, which, besides
the term corresponding to the expected in‡ation, also contains one corresponding to
thepastin‡ation. Similarformulation isdeveloped in Galí and Gertler (1999), where
the presence of backward-looking …rms generates in‡ation persistence and is tested
for the U.S. economy. They have concluded that backward-looking price setting,
although statistically signi…cant, is not quantitatively important.1 Nevertheless, as
1See Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2001) for similar estimation for the Euro area.
5we will see, even a small share of backward-looking …rms has important implications
for the welfare.
Furthermore, the New Keynesian Phillips curve implies that announcements of
disin‡ation, if perfectly credible, result in instantaneous adjustment of in‡ation
expectations, generating a costless disin‡ation. This result seems to be in contrast
to the empirical …nding, documented in Ball (1994), that disin‡ations are commonly
accompanied by a reduction in the detrended output and employment.
Initially, I work with an aggregate supply curve without in‡ation persistence,
showing some results that do not depend on the in‡ation persistence assumption.
Subsequently, I introduce some persistence in in‡ation and investigate its implica-
tions for the previous conclusions.
Thepaperisorganized inthe following manner. Section2presentsthetheoretical
model. Section 3 solves the model with and without commitment. Section 4 de…nes
the parameter values of the model, and evaluates the e¤ects of the di¤erent policies
on the welfare. The basic conclusions are summarized in the last section.
2 The Model
I use an optimizing AS-IS-LM model with monopolistically competitive …rms and
time-dependent sticky prices, based on Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999). The ag-
gregate supply curve (AS) is given by:
¼t = ¸xt +¯Et¼t+1 +ut; (1)
where ¼t is the rate of in‡ation—de…ned as pt ¡pt¡1, where pt is the price level—xt
is the output gap, ¯ is a discount factor, Et refers to expectations conditional upon
information available at time t, and ut represents a “cost-push shock”. Throughout
the paper, all the variables in lower case represent log-deviations from their steady-
state values.2 The output gap is xt ´ yt¡y¤
t, where yt is the actual output and y¤
t is
the potential output. The latter is de…ned as the output that would prevail if prices
2These are the values prevailing with fully ‡exible prices and no stochastic disturbances.
6and wages were perfectly ‡exible. This Phillips curve is obtained from intertemporal
optimization of monopolistically competitive …rms under price rigidity. The deriva-
tion is in the appendix. It employs an assumption used by Calvo (1983), in which,
every period, each …rm has a …xed probability µ of not adjusting its price, indepen-
dently of the last time the …rm adjusted it. This leads to ¸ = (1¡ µ)(1¡ ¯µ)·µ
¡1,
where · is the output elasticity of marginal cost.3
Nevertheless, this formulation of the Phillips curve delivers some counterfactual
results, as stressed in Galí and Gertler (1999) and Fuhrer (1997). It implies that
current changes in in‡ation are negatively related to the lagged output gap, that is,
a positive output gap would lead to a reduction in the in‡ation rate in the following
period. In contrast, the empirical evidence is that a positive output gap is followed
by an increase in the in‡ation rate over the cycle. Moreover, as noted before, this
formulation implies that, with perfectly credible announcements, a disin‡ation is
costless.
These empirical results have motivated some authors to work with an aggregate
supply curve that includes in‡ation persistence. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) have gen-
erated in‡ation persistence assuming that agents care about relative wages over the
life of the wage contract. Roberts (1997, 1998) has found some empirical evidence
that expectations are less than perfectly rational: a fraction of the agents would
have adaptive expectations or there would be a partial adjustment of expectations
(these would adjust only gradually to the fully rational value).
Thepaperfocusesonthee¤ectsofin‡ationpersistenceitself, withoutaparticular
concern aboutthe speci…cderivation forthe persistence. Theaggregate supplycurve
(AS) presents a hybrid form:
¼t = ¸xt +°fEt¼t+1 +°b¼t¡1 +ut: (2)
One possibility for the derivation of these parameters is the formulation built
in Galí and Gertler (1999). There is a fraction ! of backward-looking …rms that
3The optimization generates ¼t = Âmct+¯Et¼t+1; where Â ´ (1¡µ)(1¡¯µ)µ
¡1 and mct is the
real marginal cost. Assuming the latter is proportional to the output gap, mct = ·xt, we obtain
equation (1), where ¸ ´ Â·. Then ut represents deviations from this proportion.
7determines prices according to the rule of thumb pb
t = p¤
t¡1 +¼t¡1; where pb
t is the
price charged by a backward-looking …rm that is allowed to adjust price at time t,
and p¤
t¡1 is the price of a forward-looking …rm that adjusted its price in the previous
period. In this formulation, the resulting parameters of the hybrid AS curve are
¸ = (1¡!)(1¡µ)(1¡¯µ)·%¡1; °f = ¯µ%¡1; °b = !%¡1;with % ´ µ+!(1¡µ(1¡¯)):
If ¯ = 1; then °f +°b = 1. When ! = 0, equation (2) reduces to (1).
This formulation allows the presence of in‡ation persistence to a¤ect the coe¢-
cient ¸ (a greater ! decreases the value of ¸). Nonetheless, the speci…c de…nition of
the rule of thumb or other mechanism that generates in‡ation persistence involves
some arbitrariness. Therefore, the paper also works with the case where °b is not
restricted by this structural form.
The aggregate demand curve (IS) is
xt = ¡¾(it ¡ Et¼t+1) + Etxt+1 +gt; (3)
where it is the nominal interest rate, gt stands for a demand shock, and ¾ is the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption. This relation can be derived
from intertemporal optimization by an in…nitely-lived representative household in
the presence of government consumption.4 The derivation is in the appendix.
The interest rate is the policyinstrumentvariable controlled bythe central bank.
Themonetaryauthorityadjusts the quantityofmoneyin orderto achievethedesired
interest-rate level. The money market equilibrium is shown in the appendix.
I assume both shocks follow a …rst-order autoregressive process:
ut+1 = ½ut +»
u
t+1; (4)












, Gt and Yt stand for
government consumption and output, and ¹ G and ¹ Y are their steady-state values. gt can also re‡ect
autonomous changes in consumption, as a result, for example, of variations in the taste. We can also





t are i.i.d. mean-zero random variables, and 0 · ½;¿ < 1. The
current shocks are assumed to be observed by both the central bank and private
agents when making their decisions.


















t represent output-gap and in‡ation-rate targets, respectively, ®
measures society’s dislike of in‡ation variability (a smaller ® represents a greater
aversion to in‡ation variability), and the discount factor ¯ is generally assumed to
have the same value as that in the AS equation. Rotemberg and Woodford (1998)
and Woodford (1999b) have derived similar objective function (with ¼¤
t = 0) from a
household’s utility function.5
The presence of a positive output-gap target may arise from the existence of dis-
tortions in the economy (taxes, imperfect competition) that prevent itfrom reaching
the social optimum. A certain positive value for the in‡ation target, in turn, allows
negative real interest rates, which can possibly be optimal in some circumstances,
for example, with a negative demand shock.6 Moreover, the veri…ed empirical costs
ofreduction in thelevel of the in‡ation rate mayworkasdeterrent to a zero-in‡ation
target.
3 Optimal Monetary Policy
The central bank’s preferences are assumed to be the same as those of the society.
The monetary authority minimizes the social loss function (6), subject to equations
(1), and (3)-(5), in the case without in‡ation persistence. Theoptimization problem
can be solved in two stages. In the …rst, the central bank chooses fxt+i, ¼t+ig1
i=0 to
5Steinsson (2000) has derived a loss function in the presence of in‡ation persistence. Besides the
terms corresponding to the deviations of in‡ation rate and output gap, the objective function also
includes a term that penalizes the variation of in‡ation rate (¼t ¡ ¼t¡1)
2. I use only the objective
function usually employed in the literature in order to concentrate on some results and compare
them with the case without in‡ation persistence.
6Fischer (1994) has also stressed that the measures of in‡ation are biased upwards, and, because
of some downward price in‡exibility, the output costs of negative in‡ation rates may be greater.
9minimize (6) subject to (1) and (4). In the second stage, given the state-contingent
paths for output gap and in‡ation, it is possible to …nd the corresponding path for
the interest rate using equations (3) and (5).7















Át+i(¸xt+i +¯¼t+i+1 +ut+i ¡ ¼t+i)]g; (7)
where Át is a non-negative Lagrange multiplier, with initial condition Át¡1 = 0. In
the model with in‡ation persistence, equation (2) substitutes for the AS restriction
included in the Lagrangian.







¼t+i = Át+i ¡ Át+i¡1 +¼
¤
t+i: (9)
The basic di¤erence between optimal monetary policies under commitment and
discretion is the way the central banktakes into account the private agents’ expecta-
tions when minimizing the loss function. With commitment, themonetaryauthority
chooses once and for all the state-contingent paths of output gap, in‡ation rate and
interest rate. Since its future actions will be committed to a certain plan previously
de…ned at the moment of the optimization, the policymaker can exploit the e¤ect of
its decisions on the private agents’ expectations. Therefore, the central bank takes
into account the e¤ect of its decisions on the private agents’ expectations. Suppose
the optimization takes place at i = 0. When future arrives, i ¸ 1, the action of the
central bank is conditioned by the optimal plan de…ned at i = 0, which guaranteed
the optimization for the whole period, i.e., since i = 0.
7Although the paper presents the corresponding path for the interest rate, its focus is welfare,
which, in the present model speci…cation, does not depend on the behavior of the interest rate.
10Under discretion, however, thecentral bankisallowedtoreoptimizeeveryperiod.
The optimal response is not restricted by any behavior or rule assumed in the past.
Therefore, the central bank cannot commit itself to any behavior in the future. As a
result, the policymaker cannot exploit promises of future behavior in order to a¤ect
the private agents’ expectations.
The solution in the discretionary case turns out to be time consistent, whereas
in the commitment case it is time inconsistent. This di¤erence is emphasized in
Svensson and Woodford (1999) using the Lagrangian approach. Under either dis-
cretion or commitment, when i = 0, the expectations of current in‡ation formed in
the previous period do not a¤ect the social loss function to be minimized. Thus, the
restriction of the previous period is not binding, which leads to Át+i¡1 = 0. Since
under discretion the central bank is allowed to reoptimize every period, Át+i¡1 = 0
for every i ¸ 0. This imparts time consistency to the solution: for any i ¸ 0, the
optimal response of the control variables, conditional on the state of the economy,
will be unchanged. Note that Át+i¡1 = 0 corresponds to taking Et¼t+i+1 as given in
the minimization of the social loss function.
Under commitment, in turn, Át+i¡1 isnot generally equal to zero for every period
i ¸ 1. Consequently, the state-contingentoptimal behavior fori ¸ 1 de…ned at i = 1
may be di¤erent from the one obtained at i = 0. Therefore, the solution is not time
consistent.
First, the paper deals with the solution in the case under discretion and then
turns to the one under commitment, considering, in each case, two situations: the
presence and the absence of in‡ation persistence.8 In addition, I also deal with
the commitment solution when the optimal output-gap response is restricted to be
within a certain family of rules (“restricted commitment”).
8Part of the derivation of the optimal solutions of this section follows Clarida, Galí, and Gertler
(1999). In addition to the derivation in that paper, I generalize for the case where the in‡ation-rate
target is greater than zero, and solve for the commitment case with in‡ation persistence, besides
solving for discretion with in‡ation persistence and ½ > 0. Furthermore, I deal with the cases
under discretion with in‡ation persistence and under restricted commitment when the output-gap
target is greater than zero, and I solve numerically for the case under restricted commitment with
in‡ation persistence. Svensson and Woodford (1999) and Woodford (1999a) have also worked with
a similar model, but without including in‡ation persistence.
113.1 Optimal Monetary Policy without Commitment
Under discretion and without in‡ation persistence, the optimal response of the out-








Substituting equation (10) into the AS curve, solving it forward with rational ex-











Plugging this equation into (10), we obtain the optimal output gap, expressed in






In equilibrium, therefore, a positive output-gap target leads to a greaterin‡ation
rate without a¤ecting theoptimal output gap. Furthermore, thereis no linkbetween
the output gap and its past behavior. The monetary authority uses the interest rate
as the policy variable to reach the optimal output gap.
Using (10), (12), and the aggregate demand curve (equation 3), we can express













where ¼S = ¼¤ +
®
¸x¤. The interest rate increases more than the rise in the expected
in‡ation.
In the model with in‡ation persistence, the future in‡ation rate also depends
directly on the current in‡ation rate. Therefore, the central bank takes into account
9When ¯ = 0:99, as it is generally assumed in the literature for quarterly data, the coe¢cients
on ¼¤ and x¤ are di¤erent from those in equation (11), but the di¤erence is not quantitatively
important. The same reasoning is valid for (12), which would contain quantitatively unimportant
terms associated with ¼¤ and x¤. I keep ¯ in the cost-push shock term because the expression is still
valid when ¼¤ = x¤ = 0. I also assume throughout the paper that Etx¤
t+i = x¤ and Et¼¤
t+i = ¼¤
for any i ¸ 0, i.e., there are no expectations of change in the output-gap and in‡ation-rate targets.
12that current decisions a¤ect future in‡ation by the lagged in‡ation term. Nonethe-
less, in the rational expectation equilibrium, the link between in‡ation rate and its
lagged value depends on the expectations concerning future in‡ation, and hence de-
pends on the expected future behavior of the central bank. Since the central bank is
not committed, it cannot exploit how the private agents’ expectations are a¤ected
by its current decisions. As a consequence, it takes as given the link between future
and current in‡ation.
I use the method of undetermined coe¢cients. The postulated solution is that
in‡ation follows
¼t ¡ ¼
s = a¼(¼t¡1 ¡ ¼
s) + auut; (14)
where ¼s ´ a¼¤¼¤ + ax¤x¤, which represents the steady-state in‡ation. In this case,
the central bank takes as given the coe¢cients a¼, au, a¼¤, and ax¤. First, I lead
equation (14), take expectations, and substitute for the expected in‡ation term in
(2). I substitute the resulting equation for the AS curve included in the Lagrangian










Át+i ¡ ¯°bÁt+i+1 +¼
¤
t+i: (16)
Solving (15) for Át+i, and substituting into (16), we obtain a …rst-order di¤erence
equation for xt+i. Solving forward this equation, and using (14), we …nd the solution
for the optimal output-gap response. Using this solution into the AS curve, and
matching the coe¢cients with equation (14), it is possible to …nd the values for the
unknown coe¢cients. Assuming °f + °b = 1, that is, there is no long-run trade-o¤
between in‡ation rate and output gap for a stable in‡ation rate, then a¼¤ = 1, and














¤ ´ (°f + ¯°b), and ¼s = ¼¤ +®[1¡ ¯ +(¯ ¡a¼)°f]¸
¡1x¤. Assuming also
that ¯ = 1, then ¼s = ¼¤ + ®(1 ¡ a¼)°f¸
¡1x¤.10 The path of the in‡ation rate is
given by equation (14), and a¼ is the stable root of a cubic equation (0 · a¼ < 1),
being a function of ¸; ¯; ®; °b and °f, and re‡ects the inverse of the speed of
disin‡ation.11 A higher degree of in‡ation persistence (°b) or a lower aversion to
in‡ation variability (a greater ®) raises a¼, i.e., the disin‡ation is slower.
With in‡ation persistence, the output gap responds not only to the cost-push
shock, butalsotochangesin thein‡ation-ratetarget(¼¤). Forinstance, ifthecentral
bank lowers the in‡ation-rate target, the current in‡ation will be di¤erent from the
target because of the in‡ation persistence component, leading to a reaction of the
optimum output gap. The output gap, however, is not bound by its past behavior,
which only matters as it a¤ects the lagged in‡ation.














The real interest rate is positive.
3.2 Optimal Monetary Policy with Commitment
Under commitment, the central bank chooses once and for all the state-contingent
paths of the output gap and in‡ation rate. Combining the …rst-order conditions
(equations 8 and 9), we obtain





Now it is the variation of output gap that responds to in‡ation. Solving (19) for ¼t,
and plugging it into the AS curve, we obtain a second-order di¤erence equation for
10With °f + °b = 1, and ¯ = 1, then ¯
¤ = 1. When x¤ = ¼¤ = 0, the dynamics of the output
gap are still given by equation (17)—with ¼S = 0—without any assumption about the values of












These expressions are independent of the values assumed for °f and °b.
14the output gap. Solving it forward yields




where ± is the stable root (0 < ± < 1).12 Di¤erently from the discretionary case, the
output response contains a lagged term that generates a more persistent behavior.
The presence of the coe¢cient ± re‡ects the dependence of the current behavior of
the central bank on its past actions. Since the past output reacted to previous cost-
push shocks, the current optimal output gap depends on the history of the shocks,
as emphasized by Svensson and Woodford (1999).
Combining the …rst-order conditions, we also obtain the dynamics of the La-
grange multiplier:
Át ¡Á







¡1x¤ is the steady-state value for the Lagrange multiplier.13 The
initial optimal output gap, however, is a¤ected by the positive output-gap target.
For instance, in the …rst period (i = 0), xt = ±x¤, which is obtained by substituting
equation (21) into (8), and using the initial condition for Át¡1. When Át reaches the
steady state, by equation (8), xt = 0. Svensson and Woodford (1999) have used the
concept of optimization from a “timeless perspective”, according to which the plan
selected today should be equal to one determined far in the past. For example, a
plan de…ned far in the past would generate an optimal current output gap that does
not depend on x¤. On the other hand, this output gap would depend on the entire
history of the shocks. When conducting the simulations, I assume that the lagged
Lagrange multiplier is at its steady-state value, that is, the optimal output gap is
insulated from x¤ and there is a history of no shocks.





2a¯ , with a ´ ®
®(1+¯)+¸
2: I assume ¯ = 1 to avoid the presence of an unimportant
extra term (¡¸(1 ¡ ¯)(¯®)¡1¼¤) in equation (20).













Although there is no in‡ation persistence, the current in‡ation rate depends on
the past actions of the central bank. Since the policymaker is committed, the lagged
output gap is an indicator of its current and future path. The path for the in‡ation
rate can also be expressed as (after combining equations 1, 8, 9, 20, and 22):
¼t = ¼





In the steady state, ¼t = ¼¤, i.e., under commitment, a positive output-gap target
does not lead to any in‡ationary bias.
Employing (19), and the aggregate demand curve, it is possible to express the











in‡ation (negative real interest rate).











Solving equation (25) for Át+i, substituting into (26), and then using the AS
curve, we obtain a fourth-order di¤erence equation for the output gap. Solving it
forward, and again using (26), the optimal output gap follows








where the values of b1;b2 and b3 depend on several parameters.14 The optimal output
gap depends on its past behavior (“commitment e¤ect”) and on the deviations of
the past in‡ation from the in‡ation target.
14b1 ´ [°f(±1 + ±2) ¡ ±1±2¯]={; b2 ´ ±1±2¯={; and b3 ´ 1=[°b¯{(±3 ¡ ½)(±4 ¡ ½)], where
{ ´ °f ¡±1±2¯
2°b; ±1 and ±2 are the stable roots of the di¤erence equation, and ±3 and ±4 are the
unstable ones. As before, I assume ¯ = 1 and °b + °f = 1 to avoid the presence of extra terms
related to ¼¤ and x¤.
16The path for the Lagrange multiplier is obtained in a similar way to that of the
output gap. It follows
Át ¡ Á
¤ = b1(Át¡1 ¡ Á
¤) +b2(¼t¡1 ¡¼
¤) + b3ut; (28)
where Á
¤ = ®¸
¡1x¤ is the steady-state value for the Lagrange multiplier.
Solving (25) for the Lagrange multiplier, plugging it into (26), and using (27) to
substitute for xt and xt+1, we obtain the path for the in‡ation rate:
¼t = ¼
¤ +c1xt¡1 +c2(¼t¡1 ¡ ¼
¤) + c3ut; (29)
where the values of c1;c2; and c3 depend on several parameters.15 Now the in‡ation
ratedependsonboth thepastbehaviorofthe central bankandthe laggedin‡ation.16
As before, a positive output-gap target does not generate any in‡ationary bias.
3.3 Optimal Monetary Policy with “Restricted Commit-
ment”
The distinction between discretion and commitment stems from the way the private
agents’ expectations are taken into consideration when the central bank optimizes.
This subsection deals with the case where the central bank takes into account the
private agents’ expectations, but the output-gap response is restricted to have the
same structure as in the discretionary case, i.e., it is a function only of the cost-
push shock. Di¤erently from the commitment case—which is also called the “global
solution”—the optimal output gap is restricted to respond only to the state variable
of the system. I call this case “restricted commitment”. The optimal output-gap
response is given by:
xt = ¡ºut; (30)
where º is a parameter whose value is to be determined when minimizing the loss
function. Substituting equation (30) into the aggregate supply curve, and solving it
15c1 ´ ®(b2
1¯
2°b ¡ b1¯ + °f)=(¸¯(1 + ¯°bb2)), c2 ´ b2(1 ¡ ¯°b(±1 + ±2)), c3 ´ b3(1 ¡ (b1 +
½)¯°b)=(1 + ¯°bb2).
16The optimal interest rate (not shown) can be expressed as a function of current or expected











To solve the optimization problem, we can substitute directly equations (30) and
(31) for the output gap and in‡ation rate in the loss function. Alternatively, in order















½ut+i + ut+i ¡ ¼t+i)]g; (33)
where Át is a non-negative Lagrange multiplier.



























2 + ®(1 ¡¯½)2ut: (37)




2 +®(1¡ ¯½)2ut: (38)
17As before, I assume ¯ = 1 to avoid the presence of unimportant extra terms in this equation
and of slightly di¤erent coe¢cients on ¼¤ and x¤ in equation (37).
18Compared to the discretionary case (equation 12), the response of the output
gap is stronger (when ½ > 0). Note that in the absence of persistence in the shock
process (½ = 0), the solutions turn out to be identical. Since the expected value of
thecost-push shockforthe followingperiodsis zero, thecentral bank cannotpromise
some future output behavior in order to a¤ect current in‡ation. In contrast to the
commitment solution, where the output-gap response is notrestricted to be within a
family of rules, under restricted commitment the output is allowed to respond only
to the current shock.
Combining (36), (38), and the aggregate demand curve, we can express the path













where ¼S = ¼¤ +
®(1¡¯½)
¸ x¤. Comparing to (13), we can see that the response of the
real interest rate under restricted commitment is higher than that under discretion.
For the model with in‡ation persistence, the output gap responds to the two
state variables:
xt = ¡º1(¼t¡1 ¡¼S) ¡ º2ut; (40)
I use numerical methods to …nd the values of º1 and º2.
4 Welfare
This section compares the three solutions (discretion, commitment, and restricted
commitment) in terms of their e¤ects on the welfare, given by the loss function. To
measure the value of the loss function, I use the unconditional expectation (denoted
by the operator E) of the loss function de…ned in equation (6).18 After multiplying
by 2(1¡ ¯), the value of the loss function is calculated as:
L = Ef®(xt ¡x
¤)
2 +(¼t ¡ ¼
¤)
2g: (41)
18See, for example, Woodford (1999c), and Rudebusch and Svensson (1999).
19Since the unconditional expectation of the output gap is zero in any of the three
solutions, and the unconditional expectation of in‡ation is ¼¤ + ¼ib, equation (41)
can be rewritten as:





where Var stands for the unconditional variance, and ¼ib for the in‡ationary bias,
which isde…ned as the in‡ation rate resultingfrom the presence of a positiveoutput-
gap target (x¤ > 0). Therefore, the loss function comprises two elements: the
weighted unconditional variances of the output gap and in‡ation rate (“dynamic
loss”), and two terms associated with the presence of a positive output-gap target.
4.1 Parameter Values
The choice of the parameter values is based on the empirical literature, specially
Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), and Galí and Gertler (1999).19 Nevertheless, I
also analyze the consequences of assuming di¤erent parameter values not only for
robustness reasons, but also to understand the e¤ects of each parameter and its role
in the di¤erences across policy regimes. For instance, I show the e¤ects of assuming
di¤erentvaluesfor®(the relative outputweightin theobjectivefunction), °b (degree
of in‡ation persistence), and µ (degree of price rigidity).
The discount factor (¯) is usually assumed to be 0.99. According to the Euler
equation (equation 62 in the Appendix), this value implies a real interest rate of
about 4% per year in the steady state.
For the degree of price rigidity, I use µ = 0:75, which implies that …rms adjust
their prices once a year on average. Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) have used
µ = 0:66, based on the …ndings of Blinder (1994). Galí and Gertler (1999) have
found approximately µ = 0:83 or greater than that, but they have stressed that the
estimation is likely to be upward biased.
19The aim of the paper, however, is not to reproduce the moments and dynamic paths of the vari-
ables veri…ed empirically. For this purpose, see Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), whose estimation
includes the reaction function of the Federal Reserve to shocks.
20It is more di¢cult to …nd a value for the output elasticity of marginal cost (·),
which combined with µ and ¯ de…ne the value of ¸ (the coe¢cient on the output
gap in the aggregate supply curve). I use · = 0:3 as the benchmark case. Combined
with the values assumed for µ and ¯, we obtain ¸ = 0:0257 (if using in‡ation
rate measured at an annualized rate, ¸ = 0:1028), close to the value estimated in
Rotembergand Woodford (1998)(¸ = 0:024). Inthe modelusedforthe derivation of
the aggregate supplycurve (seeAppendix), · = °c+°n, where°c is theinverseofthe
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption, and °n is the inverse of the
elasticity of labor supply with respect to the real wage. In this model, · represents
the elasticity of the real wage with respect to output (equation 93). Rotemberg and
Woodford (1998) have also used 0.3 as the value for this elasticity based on some
empirical literature.20 For °c, they have estimated a value of 0.16 (an intertemporal
elasticity of substitution equal to 6.25), implying, in the present model, °n = 0:14
(a wage elasticity of labor supply equal to 7.14).21 Galí (2000), on the other hand,
in a similar model, has used the values °c = 1 (log-utility function for consumption)
and °n = 1, resulting in · = 2, and ¸ = 0:1713 (¸ = 0:6853 using in‡ation rate
measured at an annualized rate). As a robustness exercise, I also show some results
with the values of 1 and 2 for ·.
When working with the aggregate supply curve that includes in‡ation persis-
tence (equation 2), I use two di¤erent speci…cations. The …rst one is based on
Galí and Gertler (1999), where the values of °b and °f depend on the share of
backward-looking …rms (!). I consider two values for !: 0.25 and 0.5, which re-
‡ect approximately the estimates in Galí and Gertler (1999) using two di¤erent
methodological speci…cations. In their formulation, the value of ¸ is a¤ected by
!.22 Nevertheless, since the main interest is to investigate the e¤ects of in‡ation
persistence, independently of the speci…c derivation for the persistence, I also work
with a model where the values for °b and °f are de…ned directly (with the restriction
20Their model, however, presents some di¤erences in the theoretical speci…cation for ·.
21King and Woolman (1999) have assumed °n = 0:1.
22With ! = 0:25 and 0.5, the annualized values of ¸ amount to 0.058 and 0.031, and the values
of °b are equal to 0.250 and 0.401, respectively (using ¯ = 0:99, and µ = 0:75).
21°b + °f = 1), without a¤ecting ¸. For example, when investigating the e¤ects of
in‡ation persistence on the gains from commitment, I consider all possible values
for °b, keeping ¸ …xed.
For the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (¾ ´ 1
°c) in the IS curve, I use
the mentioned value of 6.25 (or 1.56 for annualized rates of in‡ation and interest).
This parameter in the IS curve a¤ects only the magnitude of the response of the
interest rate. It does not have e¤ect on the value of the loss function.
The choice of the relative output weight in the objective function (®) di¤ers sig-
ni…cantlyin the literature. According to the derivation in Rotemberg and Woodford
(1998) and Woodford (1999b), ® =
¸
#, where # is the elasticity of demand for an
individual good, which was estimated as 7.88. This leads to ® = 0:003, which, using
annualized in‡ation rate, is equivalent to 16 times this, i.e., approximately ® = 0:05.
As of now I refer to the values of ® corresponding to the speci…cation that uses the
annualized in‡ation rate. On the other hand, Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) have
evaluated alternative policies assuming di¤erent values for ®, such as 0.2 or 5, but
have worked mainly with ® = 1.
The paper focuses on evaluating the results of assuming di¤erent values for ®,
which has important e¤ects in terms of in‡ationary bias and variability of output
and in‡ation. When working with some basic cases, the choice is based on the
resulting relative variances of output and in‡ation. Since the absolute values of the
variability of output and in‡ation are very sensitive to the assumptions concerning
the variance of the random cost-push shock (»
u
t ), I search for values of ® that result
in a ratio of the standard deviation of output gap to that of in‡ation—“ratio of
variability” for brevity—closer to those observed empirically. Using quarterly data
for the U.S. economy, from 1960:1 to 2000:1, the standard deviation of the output
gap is 2.61, measured employing the GDP, and the Potential GDP estimated by the
Congressional Budget O¢ce (CBO). For the annualized in‡ation rate (using GDP
de‡ator), the standard deviation is 2.48, resulting in a ratio of variability of 1.05.
Considering only a more recent period (1980:1 - 2000:1), the values of the standard
22deviations are 2.33 for the output gap, and 2.07 for in‡ation, resulting in a ratio of
1.13.23
Theratioofvariabilityinthesimulations, however, dependson thevalueassumed
for the autoregressive coe¢cient of the cost-push equation (½). I use two values:
½ = 0:6 and 0:8. In the benchmark case, for a range of the ratio of variability
between 0.9 and 1.5, ® goes from 0.07 to 0.43 with ½ = 0:6, and from 0.07 to 0.71
with ½ = 0:8. With in‡ation persistence, using ½ = 0:6, the range is not very
a¤ected.24 As a result, I choose ® = 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5 as the basic cases, besides
showing some results for more extreme values (® = 0.04 and 1).
The value of the standard deviation of the random cost-push shock (»
u
t ) a¤ects
the absolute value of the unconditional variances of in‡ation and output, but not
their relative values across regimes. It a¤ects, however, the importance of the gains
under commitment coming from the unconditional variances in comparison to those
stemming from the absence of in‡ationary bias. I do the following exercise to …nd
a reasonable range value for the variability of »
u
t . Initially, I …nd the values of ®,
in each regime, that result in a ratio of variability of 1.1. For the benchmark case,
with ½ = 0:6, the calculated values of ® are 0.094, 0.231, and 0.318 for discretion, re-
stricted commitment, and commitment, respectively.25 Then I …nd the values forthe
variability of the random cost-push shock that generate absolute values of standard
deviation of output and in‡ation similar to those empirically observed. Assuming
½ = 0:6, an annualized standard deviation of »
u
t equal to 1.0%—corresponding to
a standard deviation of 1.25% for ut—generates values close to those empirically
observed.26 In the model with in‡ation persistence, the simulations indicate a stan-
23The estimates in the literature are close to these values. In McCallum and Nelson (1999),
which use a di¤erent method for estimating the output gap, the estimates imply a ratio of 1.08
(1955-1996). The estimates in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), which employ a method similar to
that used by the CBO, and measure in‡ation as the four-quarter average, result in a ratio of 1.20
(1961:1 - 1996:2) .
24It goes from 0.07 to 0.44 with ! = 0:25, and from 0.07 to 0.52 with ! = 0:5. With in‡ation
persistence term (°b) equal to 0.4 de…ned directly, however, the range goes from 0.19 to 1.16
25With ½ = 0:8, the values of ® are 0.094, 0.450, and 0.543.
26Using ½ = 0:8, however, a more reasonable annualized standard deviation of »
u
t is 0.5%,
corresponding to a standard deviation of 0.83% for ut.
23dard deviation of about 0.6% for »
u
t .27 Unless otherwise noticed, I assume the value
of 1.0%. When comparing the gains under commitment coming from the uncondi-
tional moments to those from the absence of in‡ationary bias, I also use the value
of 0.6%.
Finally, to measure the consequences of imperfect competition on the potential
output (equation 99), it is necessary to assume some values for the elasticity of
substitution among alternative goods (#). I use the mentioned value of 7.88, besides
the value of 4, used by King and Wolman (1999), which imply steady-statemark-ups
equal to 1.15 and 1.33, respectively. I also consider a mark-up equal to 1.1.
The simulations were conducted using the procedure in Söderlind (1999), and
were compared with the analytical solutions when available. The unconditional
variances were calculated using formula in Hamilton (1994, pp. 264-266).28 In the
case of restricted commitment, I employ the analytical results for the model without
in‡ation persistence, and use numerical methods to …nd the optimal output-gap
response with in‡ation persistence.
4.2 Unconditional Variances
The objective function includes neither interest-rate smoothing nor penalty for
interest-rate variability. Consequently, any demand shock can be completely o¤set
by the central bank by moving the interest rate accordingly. The source of move-
ments of the output gap and in‡ation rate around the steady state is the cost-push
shock. This subsection initially presents the results in the model without in‡ation
persistence, and subsequently those with in‡ation persistence.
4.2.1 Model without In‡ation Persistence
Table 1 presents the results for the benchmark case. It shows the values of the un-
conditional standard deviations of output gap and annualized in‡ation rate, and the
value of the loss function associated with di¤erent policies. In order to concentrate
27With ! = 0:25 and 0:5, the simultations indicate 0.6% and 0.4%, whereas with °b = 0:4 the
value is 0.6% (all assuming ½ = 0:6).
28Using iteration to …nd the unconditional variances generates similar results.
24on the e¤ects in terms of stabilization, the value of the loss function reported in all
tables and …gures, except in Figure 13, is calculated assuming x¤ = 0, i.e., the loss
is the weighted sum of the unconditional variances. Table 1 shows the results for
® = 0.04, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, and 1.0, considering ½ = 0:6, whereas Table 2 reports the
values for the case with ½ = 0:8.
The solution under commitment is clearly superior to that under discretion.29
The valueof theloss function under commitment is substantially lower: it isbetween
53% and 74% of the value under discretion with ½ = 0:6, and between 40% and 55%
with ½ = 0:8, for the values of ® considered in Tables.1 and 2.30 For instance, with
® = 0:3 in Table 1, thevalue ofthe lossfunction for commitment corresponds to 62%
of that for discretion. Figure 1 shows the ratios of the value of loss function under
discretion to those under commitment and restricted commitment as a function of
®, assuming ½ = 0:6. For large values of ®, the di¤erence across regimes tends to be
smaller.
Under restricted commitment, the welfare is superior to that under discretion,
and inferior to that under commitment. The magnitude of the gains, however, de-
pends highly on the values of ½. With ½ = 0:6, the gains are not signi…cative: the
value of the loss function under restricted commitment is between 83% and 98%
of the value under discretion, whereas with ½ = 0:8, it is between 57% and 88%
(using Tables 1 and 2). Figure 2 shows the ratios of the value of loss function under
discretion to those under commitment and restricted commitment as a function of
½. A higher ½ increases the e¤ect of a cost-push shock in the expected in‡ation.
Consequently, it is more important to a¤ect the private agents’ expectations, result-
ing in more gains for any of the commitment solutions. Nevertheless, the gains from
restricted commitment are signi…cant only when ½ is extremely high. Employing
(11), (12), (37), and (38), it can be shown that the ratio of the value of the loss
29Similar result has also been found by McCallum and Nelson (2000), who have quanti…ed the
value of the losses under commitment and discretion, including the in‡ationary bias, but without
considering speci…cally the di¤erences in terms of variability of output and in‡ation.
30See the last columns of the tables. The penultimate column records the inverse of the last
one: it shows the ratio of the value of the loss under discretion to the loss under the regime in the
corresponding line.







where k1 is decreasing in ½31. Therefore, the loss under discretion is greater than
that under restricted commitment, and the di¤erence is increasing in ½.
Considering the unconditional moments separately, the variance of in‡ation is
lower under commitment than under discretion in the benchmark case. Figures 3
and 4 show the standard deviations of in‡ation and output under the three regimes
as a function of ®. As expected, a greater ® leads to a lower output variance and
a higher in‡ation variance. The variability of output, however, is higher under
commitment than that under discretion for the benchmark case.
Nevertheless, the comparison of the variances depends ultimately on the param-
eter values. In particular, when ½ = 0 and ¯ = 0:99, using equations (12) and (20),
it is possible to …nd that, for the variance of output under commitment to be equal
or greater than that under discretion, it is necessary that
® ¸ 4:7443¸
2: (44)
Since in the benchmark case, ¸ = 0:1028, the condition is ful…lled for ® ¸ 0:050.
For ½ > 0, the requirement is veri…ed even for lower values of ®. Using numerical
simulations, it is possible to …nd that with ½ = 0:6 and 0:8, the conditions are
® ¸ 1:715¸
2 and ® ¸ 1:274¸
2, which are reached for ® ¸ 0:018 and ® ¸ 0:013,
respectively.
Table 3 shows some results for a larger value of the output elasticity of marginal
cost (·). For · = 1 with ® = 0:1, and for · = 2, condition (44) is not satis…ed:
the standard deviation of output under commitment is smaller than that under
discretion.32
For the variance of in‡ation under commitment to be lower than that under







32In a numerical example, Galí (2000) has found a variance of output under commitment smaller
than that under discretion because he has used · = 2.
26discretion, the condition, with ½ = 0 and ¯ = 0:99, is
® ¸ 0:53993¸
2; (45)
which can be found using (11), (20), and (19).
This condition is easily veri…ed in the benchmark case (requires only ® ¸ 0:006).
In the case of ½ = 0:6 or 0:8, all combinations of values of ® and ¸ imply a lower
variance of in‡ation under commitment than under discretion.33 In fact, all cases
shown in Tables 1 to 3 present this feature. Therefore, we can conclude that, with
the model speci…cation of this paper, policies under commitment usually generate
a lower in‡ation variability than that under discretion as well as result, for a large
range of parameter values, in a higher output-gap variability.
Likewise the solution underrestricted commitment delivers a lowerin‡ation vari-
ability and a higher output variability than those under discretion when ½ > 0.
Di¤erently from the commitment case, this result is independent of the parameter
values. Analytically, it can be seen comparing equations (37) with (11), and (38)
with (12). The comparison of the in‡ation-rate and output-gap variabilities un-
der restricted commitment with those under commitment, however, depends on the
combination of the parameter values of ®;½; and ¸.
Figure 5 presents the trade-o¤ between the variabilities of output gap and in-
‡ation for the three regimes (with and without in‡ation persistence). It shows the
possible combinations of standard deviations of output gap and in‡ation associated
with di¤erent values of ® (not shown).34 The three lines closer to the origin refer to
the model without in‡ation persistence, whereas the other three are obtained from
the case with in‡ation persistence. There exists an evident gain in the trade-o¤: for
each combination of standard deviations of output and in‡ation under discretion, it
is possible to …nd values of ® that generate, under commitment, a lower variability
for both variables.35
33Except when ¸ is close to zero (the variances of in‡ation under commitment and discretion
tend to be equal to each other).
34The values employed for ® are between 0.002 and 2. The part of the curve with high standard
deviation of output corresponds to a few extremely low values of ®.
35For instance, for a ratio of variability equal to 1.1, commitment results in standard deviations
27Under discretion, since the central bank takes as given the private agents’ ex-
pectations, it perceives the gains and costs for the loss function as if the aggregate
supply were ¼t = ¸xt +ut. Variations in the output gap are perceived as generating
only ¸ units of change in the in‡ation rate.
When the central bank can commit itself, however, there is an increment in the















Aunit of output-gap variation is perceived asproducing ¸=(1¡¯½) unitsofin‡ation-
rate variation. The trade-o¤ between in‡ation and output is improved compared to
the discretionary case. Under commitment, the improvement is still higher. Using









1¡¯± represents the gain originated from the link, represented by the root
±, between expected and past output gaps.36 Even when ½ = 0, output has a higher
e¤ect on in‡ation than that under discretion.
The gains from commitment are signi…cantly a¤ected by the degree of price
rigidity. Figure 6 shows the ratio of the value of loss function under discretion to
those under commitment and restricted commitment as a function of µ. The bene…ts
from commitment are highly pronounced in the range of values of µ that is usually
employed in the literature: between 0.55 and 0.85. The gains are virtually zero for
a low price rigidity speci…cation. The lower µ, the less important the expected value
of output and in‡ation that are about 81% of those under discretion (with ½ = 0:6 and ! = 0).
36Equation (48) can also be expressed as a function only of xt and ut. In (48) the coe¢cient on
ut is the same as those under discretion and restricted commitment.
28of marginal cost, decreasing the bene…ts from commitment. Note, however, that the
gains are close to zero for values of µ near to 1 as well. With a high value of µ, the
value of ¸ becomes very low. As a result, the expected future values of xt have small
e¤ects on the current in‡ation. Thus, the bene…ts from commitment reduce rapidly.
The di¤erence in the behavior between commitment and discretion can be seen
more clearly in Figure 7, which shows the impulse-response functions of in‡ation
rate, output gap and nominal interest rates to an annualized one-percentage-point
cost-push shock when ½ = 0. In Figures 7, 8, and 10, the output gap is measured in
percentage deviations from the steady state, and the in‡ation rate and the nominal
interest rate are measured in annualized percentage points (expressed as deviations
from a steady state with positive values). Under discretion or commitment, the
shock leads to an increase in the in‡ation rate and nominal interest rate and to
a reduction in the output gap (note that the scales of the graphs are di¤erent).
The monetary authority raises the interest rate in order to lower the output gap,
and thereby to reduce the in‡ationary pressure. Since the shock lasts for only one
period, the output-gap response under discretion has the same duration. Under
commitment, however, the output-gap reduction persists for a longer period. It
is the “output cost” of commitment: even after the shock dies out, output falls
because of its e¤ects on the in‡ation rate in the initial period. It is evident the
time inconsistency of the commitment solution. After collecting the gains in the
…rst period (i = 0), a reoptimization at i = 1 generates xt+1 = 0 as the output-gap
response.
Figure8 showsthepath of thevariableswhenthe shockpresentssomepersistence
(½ = 0:6). As before, under commitment, the in‡ation rate is lower and the output-
gap response is stronger than those under discretion. The output-gap response
shows a hump-shaped form in the commitment case: although the value of the
shock is decreasing, the response is increasing for some period. At the same time,
the nominal interest rate is initially lower under commitment.
Under restricted commitment, the shape of the responses is similar to those with
29discretion. Nevertheless, the response of the output gap is stronger and in‡ation
rate is lower than those under discretion.37
4.2.2 Model with In‡ation Persistence
If in‡ation persistence is included, the e¤ect on the loss function is very signi…cative,
even for low levels of persistence. Table 4 provides the results for the cases with ! =
0:25 and 0.5, and Table 5 for the case with °b = 0:4 (degree of in‡ation persistence
directly de…ned). Even for a small degree of in‡ation persistence (! = 0:25), the
standard deviations of output and in‡ation are between 42% and 116% greater than
those without in‡ation persistence. The e¤ect on the value of the loss function is
considerable: the loss is between 126% and 191% higher than that without in‡ation
persistence. In Figure5, itisevidentthe e¤ect of thepresence of in‡ation persistence
on the feasible combinations of variabilities.38
Nevertheless, the e¤ect of the presence of in‡ation persistence on the relative
loss across regimes is somehow surprising. Figure 9 presents the ratios of the value
of the loss function under discretion to those under commitment and restricted
commitment as a function of the degree of in‡ation persistence (°b).39 The relative
gains from commitment are increasing in °b for some important range of values of
°b. The bene…ts from commitment are increasing between °b = 0 and 0.32, and
are still superior to those without in‡ation persistence for °b · 0:46.40 The reason
seems to be that a greater in‡ation persistence has two e¤ects. On the one hand,
since a higher °b implies a lower °f, the importance of the central bank to take
into account the e¤ect of its decisions on the private agents’ expectations is smaller.
Therefore, thereexistless bene…ts from commitment. The solutionsunderdiscretion
37The di¤erence of the pattern of the responses across the three solutions is robust to di¤erent
values of ®, which a¤ect only the magnitude of the responses.
38Figure 5 assumes ! = 0:25 for the in‡ation persistence case.
39Figure 9, which employs ® = 0:3 and ½ = 0:6; was constructed without any structural form
assumption for °b, except for the condition °b + °f = 1.
40If we use a higher ®, the increase in the gains is more pronounced. Similar result is obtained
when using ! instead of °b: the bene…ts from commitment are increasing in ! for a range of
! between 0 and approximately 0.6. Using °b = 0:5 and di¤erent parameter values, McCallum
and Nelson (2000) have also found an increment in the gains from commitment with in‡ation
persistence.
30and commitment tend to be close to each other. On the other hand, a higher °b
also leads to a greater e¤ect of the cost-push shock on the value of the expected
in‡ation. Consequently, it is more important to act on the expectations. For some
range of °b, this second e¤ect dominates the …rst one. Note that a higher ½ has only
the second e¤ect. Under restricted commitment, the results are qualitatively similar
to those under commitment.
The previous results concerning the comparison of the variabilities of output
and in‡ation across regimes for the model without in‡ation persistence hold with
in‡ation persistence.41 Figure 10 shows the impulse-response functions to a cost-
push shock in a model with in‡ation persistence (! = 0:25). Qualitatively, the paths
of the variables are similar to those in the case without in‡ation persistence (with
½ > 0).42
4.3 In‡ationary Bias
The central bank attempts to reach the output-gap target. The resulting in‡ation-
ary pressure stems from two components: the current output gap, and the expected
in‡ation. In the discretionary case, the policymaker takes as given the expected in-
‡ation. Therefore, the central bank incorporates only partially the cost of a positive
output gap. Consequently, it perceives as optimal to have a positive output gap.









This equation is represented in the top panel of Figure 11, which shows the values
of in‡ation rate associated with di¤erent levels of the expected in‡ation rate. In
the steady-state equilibrium with rational expectations, ¼t = Et¼t+1, which is given
by the intersection of the 45o-degree line with the line representing equation (49).
41In the cases ! = 0:25, ! = 0:50, and °b = 0:4, the conditions for a variance of output
greater under commitment than under discretion are approximately the following: ® ¸ 1:625¸
2,
® ¸ 3:603¸
2, and ® ¸ 1:458¸
2, respectively. The variance of in‡ation is similar across the two
regimes only with ¸ close to zero.
42The main di¤erence is in the solution under restricted commitment: the maximum response
of the output gap occurs in the second period instead of the …rst one.









whose representation can be seen in the bottom panel of Figure 11. If Et¼t+1 were
zero, it would be optimum to have a positive output gap, which would not be equal
to x¤ because the central bank considers the e¤ect of the current output gap on
the in‡ation rate. Nevertheless, the private agents recognize the incentive of the
monetary authority and incorporate it in the expected in‡ation rate. As a result,
the cost of having a positive output gap increases dramatically. In fact, solving
forward the aggregate supply curve, and assuming ¯ = 1, a permanent positive
output gap “explodes” the in‡ation rate. Therefore, the costs of a positive output
gap exceed any gain obtained in the output-gap term in the loss function. As a
consequence, the resulting optimum output gap is zero.43 The equilibrium in‡ation
rate, however, is greater than zero exactly because the private agents incorporate
the incentives of the central bank into their expectations.





The smaller ®, the lower the costs of having an output gap di¤erent from the target.
Accordingly, the central bank has less incentive to achieve the output-gap target,
resulting in less in‡ationarypressure. The value ofthe in‡ationary bias isvery sensi-
tive to the value of ®. Table 6 reports the in‡ationary bias associated with di¤erent
values of ® for an output-gap target equal to 1%.44 Without in‡ation persistence,
values of ® equal to 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5 generate an (annualized) in‡ationary bias of
1.0%, 3.0%, and 5.0%, respectively. If we use the value of ® that generates the ratio
of variability equal to 1.1 in the discretionary case (® = 0:094), the in‡ationary bias
is relatively low (0.9%).
43Note that when ¯ < 1, the in‡ationary cost of xt > 0 is lower because the e¤ect of the expected
in‡ation on the current one is smaller. Consequently, it may be optimal to have a slightly positive
output gap.
44Table 1.6 assumes ¯ = 1, µ = 0:75, and · = 0:3.
32The speci…cation of the value of the output-gap target could be based on the
distortion generated by monopolist competition. Nonetheless, the estimation of
the gap between the potential output with monopolist competition and the one
with perfect competition is very sensitive to some parameter values. For instance,
using the speci…cation in the appendix (equation 99), with °c +°n ´ · = 0:3, the
output-gap target would be 45.2% for a mark-up equal to 1.15. Using ® = 0:094,
the in‡ationary bias would amount to 41.4%.45 With · = 2, the output-gap target
would be 6.8%, implying an in‡ationary bias equal to 0.9% (using · = 2 to calculate
¸ as well).
As previously observed, under commitment there is no in‡ationary bias. The
reason is that the central bank takes into consideration the e¤ect of trying to have a
positiveoutput gap on the expected in‡ation. Thus the monetaryauthoritydoesnot
have the incentive of having a positive output gap. As the private agents perceive
that the central bank does not have this incentive, they do not raise their prices. In
the discretionary case, the private agents’ perception of the central bank’s incentives
drives the in‡ation rate up, leading to an equilibrium with zero output gap. Under
commitment, it is the central bank that at …rst incorporates the cost.








The in‡ationary bias is positive because the central bank does not take into account
the e¤ect of a positive output-gap target on the in‡ationary expectations. By equa-
tion (32), the expected in‡ation, for the central bank, is restricted to be dependent
only upon the cost-push shock and the associated reaction of the output gap. On
the other hand, the in‡ationary bias is lower than that under discretion. Comparing
equation (36) to (10), the reaction of the policymaker to any in‡ationary pressure
is greater than in the discretionary case. Since the central bank recognizes that a
45With mark-ups equal to 1.1, and 1.33, the output-gap target would be 31.8%, and 95.9%, and
the in‡ationary bias would amount to 29.1%, and 87.7%, respectively.
33positive output gap generates some in‡ationary pressure by the current output gap,
it has less incentive to achieve the output-gap target, resulting in less in‡ationary
pressure. Using ½ = 0:6 and 0.8, the in‡ationary bias under restricted commitment
is 60% and 80% lower, respectively, than those under discretion.








Since 0 · (1¡a¼)°f < 1, the in‡ationary bias is smaller than that without in‡ation
persistence, for a given ¸. The reason is that the central bank takes into account
thatcurrent decisions a¤ect futurein‡ation by the lagged in‡ation term (although it
takes as given this link between in‡ation and lagged in‡ation, whose value depends
ontherational expectationequilibrium). Asa result, the costsperceivedofa positive
output gap are larger, decreasing the in‡ationary pressure.
Table 6 shows the in‡ationary bias for di¤erent cases (assuming ¯ = 1). With
°b = 0:4 (directly de…ned in the aggregate supply curve) the reduction in the in‡a-
tionary bias is signi…cant (between 66% and 74%). Figure 12 shows the in‡ationary
bias as a function of °b.47 The presence of in‡ation persistence decreases signi…-
cantly the in‡ationary bias. In the case of ! = 0:25 and 0.5, the reduction is less
pronounced because the value of ¸ is decreasing in !.
Under commitment, the comparison of the gains coming from the variances of
output and in‡ation with those from the absence of in‡ationary bias is highly sen-
sitive to the values attributed to the variance of the cost-push shock, ® and x¤.
Figure 13 shows the loss as a function of °b. It presents the total value of the
loss function (equation 42), which comprises both the loss coming from a positive
output-gap target and the dynamic loss, and the dynamic loss separately. The top
panels assume ® = 0:1, and the bottom ones use ® = 0:3 (all assume x¤ = 1%). The
46From the equation for the steady-state in‡ation in Section 3.1 (assuming °f + °b = 1, and
¯ = 1).
47It assumes ® = 0:3. The pace of the reduction in the in‡ationary bias as a result of the rise in
the degree of in‡ation persistence is not signi…cantly a¤ected by the values of ®.
34standard deviation of the cost-push shock is assumed to be 1.0% for the left panels,
and 0.6% for the right ones. For low values of degree of in‡ation persistence, the
importance of the reduction in the in‡ationary bias in comparison to the dynamic
gains depends on the parameter value speci…cation. For example, in the upper left
panel, in‡ationary bias is responsible for 11.4% of the greater loss under discretion
(with °b = 0), whereas in the lower right panel the share is 71.0%. The importance
of those gains, however, decreases rapidly as the degree of in‡ation persistence rises.
For instance, with °b = 0:3, the importance of those gains is diminutive in the four
panels.
5 Conclusions
The society is better o¤ with a policy conducted under commitment, according
to a welfare measure based on an object function that penalizes deviations of the
in‡ation rate and output gap from their targets. The solution under commitment
eliminates the in‡ationary bias and generates a lower in‡ation-rate variability than
that under discretion, although usually leading to a higher output variance. The
solution under restricted commitment, however, generates signi…cative gains only
when the cost-push shock has a high degree of persistence.
The presence of persistence in the in‡ation-rate dynamics increases signi…cantly
the output-gap and in‡ation-rate variabilities, even though it reduces the in‡ation-
arybias. Therelativegainsfromcommitmentareincreasingin thedegree ofin‡ation
persistence for moderate levels of persistence.
35Appendix
A Derivation of the Aggregate Supply and De-
mand Curves
The derivation is similar to those in the recent literature of sticky-price models, such
as Yun (1996) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1998).
A.1 The Structure of the Economy
The economy consists of private agents—households and …rms—and government.
The …rms produce di¤erentiated consumption goods.
A.1.1 Households
There is a continuum of j in…nitely-lived households, whose total is normalized to
one. Households obtain utility from consumption, real money holdings and leisure.























where °c;°m;°n; am;an > 0; ¯ is a discount factor, Mt+i are money balances, Pt+i is
the level of prices, Nt+i is the labor supply, and Ct+i is a composite index good (to
ease the notation, I omit the superscript j that should appear in the variables). Ct+i
is a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) aggregator over all the di¤erentiated









where # > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution among alternative goods,
and Ct+i(z) represents the consumption of each of the di¤erentiated good z. The















36where Bt+i are private discount bonds (zero in net supply), it is the nominal interest
rate, Tt+i are lump-sum net taxes (taxes minus transfers), Wt+i are nominal wages,
and -t+i are the pro…ts received from the …rms, which are transferred in a lump-sum
way. The total expenditure in consumption for each household is
Dt+i = Pt+iCt+i: (57)





and Nt+i to maximize the utility function subject to the budget constraint. The
problem can be solved in two stages. In the …rst one, the household chooses Ct+i(z)

















It represents the demand of each individual j for each di¤erentiated good as a func-
tion of the relative price of the good and of the total consumption of the individual.













t+i is the total household’s consumption in the economy.






the utility function (equation 54) subject to the budget constraint (equation 56). I



















































































Equation (62) represents the intertemporal optimal condition for consumption (Eu-
ler equation), (64) is the labor supply, and (65) represents the demand for money.
A.1.2 Government









where Gt+i(z) represents the government consumption of each of the di¤erentiated





subject to equation (66). Similarly to the household’s problem, the optimization







Therefore, the government purchases a proportion of each good equal to that pur-
chased by households.







Thereisa continuumofmonopolisticallycompetitive…rmsowned bythe households,
whose total is normalized to one. Each …rm produces a di¤erentiated good z and
uses the same technology. The production function is
Yt+i(z) = At+iNt+i(z); (70)
where At+i is a stochastic technological factor.
The factor demand is derived by the minimization of the …rm’s cost. Firms








where ¦t+i is the Lagrangian multiplier and represents the real marginal cost.




where Yt+i is the aggregate output.
The production of z—denoted by Yt+i(z)—faces a demand schedule obtained by








Following Calvo (1983), only a fraction of the …rms is allowed to adjust prices
each period. Every period, each …rm faces a …xed probability µ of not adjusting its
price, independently of the last time the …rm adjusted it. Therefore, a fraction 1¡µ
of the …rms is allowed to change prices at each moment. In the average, …rms adjust
price every 1
1¡µ periods. As a consequence, …rms face an intertemporal optimization.
39They have to form expectations of the future behavior of their demand and costs.





























, and Qt+i is the nominal marginal cost. ¯
iªt;i is the stochas-
tic discount factor between t and i. Since the …rms are owned by the households,
the pro…ts are discounted according to the intertemporal optimal condition for con-
sumption (equation 62).







































#¡1 is the mark-up. Since in symmetric equilibrium:
P ¤
t (z) = P ¤
t ; (79)






























40whichrepresents theminimumexpenditurerequired to buyone unitofthecomposite
consumption good.
Since a fraction µ of the …rms is not allowed to adjust prices at i, the price








A.2 Equilibrium and Approximation Around aSteady State







The equilibrium in the economy is described by equations (62), (64), (65), (70),
(72), (73), (80), and (82). I take log-approximations of the variables around the
deterministic steady state, where there is no stochastic shock and the prices are
fully ‡exible. All the lower case variables represent log-deviations from their steady-
state values; for example:




where ¹ Y is the steady-state value for the output. Since log(1 + r) ¼ r, the lower
case variables represent percentage deviations from the steady state.
A.2.1 Aggregate Demand Curve






Yt+i, and use it in












, where ¹ G is
the steady-state government consumption, taking the log-approximation, and using
the fact that log(1 +it) ¼ it, we obtain
yt ¡ et = ¡
1
°c
(it ¡ Et¼t+1) +Etfyt+1 ¡et+1g; (85)
41whereit nowstandsfor the log-deviation of the nominal interest rate from itssteady-
state value, ¼t+1 = pt+1 ¡pt represents the in‡ation rate, and et = yt ¡ct. The real
interest rate is rt ¼ it ¡Et¼t+1.
I de…ne




t is the potential output (log-deviation from its steady-state value) and
corresponds to the output that would prevail if prices and wages were perfectly
‡exible. Combining equation (85) with (86), we obtain the aggregate demand curve
or the “IS curve”:
xt = ¡¾(it ¡ Et¼t+1) + Etxt+1 +gt; (87)
where ¾ ´ 1
°c; and gt = Etf(et ¡y¤
t) ¡(et+1 ¡ y¤
t+1)g.
A.2.2 Money Market Equilibrium
The money market equilibrium (where money supply is equal to the demand Mt+i)
is given by (65), which log-linearized around the steady state is expressed as:





°m¹ {, and ¹ { is the steady-state nominal interest rate. Using the
expression for et, this equation can be written as:
mt ¡pt = ¶1yt ¡ ¶1et ¡¶2it: (89)
A.2.3 Aggregate Supply Curve
The log-linearization of equation (80) yields
p
¤




i (qt+i + pt+i)g: (90)
The price level (equation 82) in log-linear terms is
pt = µpt¡1 +(1¡ µ)p
¤
t: (91)
42Combining (90) with (91), and using the fact that p¤
t = (1¡ µ¯)(qt +pt) + µ¯p¤
t+1,
we obtain
¼t = Â(qt ¡ pt) +¯Et¼t+1; (92)
where Â ´
(1¡µ)(1¡¯µ)
µ ; and qt ¡ pt is the real marginal cost.
Using the production function and the economy resource constraint in the labor
supply equation (64), and log-linearizing it around the steady state, we obtain:
wt ¡pt = (°c + °n)yt ¡°cet ¡ °nat: (93)
Log-linearizing equation (72) around the steady state, and combining with (93),
we obtain an expression for the real marginal cost:
qt ¡pt = (°c + °n)yt ¡ °cet ¡ (1 +°n)at: (94)
Now I …nd an expression for the potential output (y¤
t). In ‡exible price equilib-











whichcan beseen as aspecialcaseof equation (78). Usingthesymmetric equilibrium
condition Pt+i(z) = Pt+i in equation (95), combining it with equations (64), (70)































t is the ratio of government pur-
chases to output in ‡exible price equilibrium. Using equations (86) and (96) in the





t ), which implies et = e¤
t, we obtain
qt ¡pt = ·xt; (97)
where · ´ (°c +°n). Therefore, in this formulation, the real marginal cost is
proportional to the output gap. Plugging into equation (92) yields
¼t = ¸xt +¯Et¼t+1; (98)
43where ¸ = (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ¯µ)·µ
¡1. The cost-push shock included in equation (1)
represents a deviation of the proportion between real marginal cost and output gap.
To …nd thee¤ectofimperfectcompetition in thelevel ofpotential output, I follow
the same procedures used to obtain equation (96), but now the log-linearization is







where y¤¤ is the deviation of potential output with monopolist competition from the
one with perfect competition (both in logs). Note that #
#¡1 is the mark-up (equal to
one in perfect competition).
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Commitment 5.54 1.04 5.33 0.023 1.90 0.53
Restricted 
Commitment
7.48 1.18 6.34 0.036 1.21 0.83
Discretion 4.80 1.86 2.58 0.044 1.00 1.00
Commitment 3.81 1.45 2.64 0.036 1.86 0.54
Restricted 
Commitment
4.75 1.87 2.54 0.058 1.14 0.88
Discretion 2.51 2.44 1.03 0.066 1.00 1.00
Commitment 2.21 1.92 1.15 0.052 1.61 0.62
Restricted 
Commitment
2.14 2.54 0.85 0.078 1.06 0.94
Discretion 0.97 2.83 0.34 0.083 1.00 1.00
Commitment 1.66 2.12 0.78 0.059 1.49 0.67
Restricted 
Commitment
1.38 2.73 0.51 0.084 1.04 0.96
Discretion 0.60 2.93 0.21 0.087 1.00 1.00
Commitment 1.10 2.35 0.47 0.068 1.35 0.74
Restricted 
Commitment
0.73 2.89 0.25 0.089 1.02 0.98
Discretion 0.31 3.00 0.10 0.091 1.00 1.00









Notes: The annualized standard deviation of the random cost-push shock is assumed to be 1%. The output is


































Commitment 10.51 1.34 7.87 0.062 2.53 0.40
Restricted 
Commitment
13.91 1.12 12.38 0.090 1.74 0.57
Discretion 9.07 3.52 2.58 0.157 1.00 1.00
Commitment 8.28 2.12 3.91 0.114 2.75 0.36
Restricted 
Commitment
11.49 2.32 4.95 0.186 1.67 0.60
Discretion 5.47 5.31 1.03 0.311 1.00 1.00
Commitment 5.64 3.29 1.71 0.204 2.38 0.42
Restricted 
Commitment
7.28 4.41 1.65 0.353 1.37 0.73
Discretion 2.35 6.85 0.34 0.486 1.00 1.00
Commitment 4.54 3.88 1.17 0.254 2.13 0.47
Restricted 
Commitment
5.32 5.38 0.99 0.431 1.25 0.80
Discretion 1.50 7.27 0.21 0.540 1.00 1.00
Commitment 3.27 4.68 0.70 0.326 1.80 0.55
Restricted 
Commitment
3.19 6.43 0.50 0.516 1.14 0.88
Discretion 0.79 7.62 0.10 0.587 1.00 1.00





Notes: The annualized standard deviation of the random cost-push shock is assumed to be 1%. The output is
measured in percentage deviations from the steady-state value, and the inflation rate is measured in
annualized percentage points.







































Commitment 2.56 0.49 5.26 0.009 1.52 0.66
Restricted 
Commitment
3.19 0.38 8.46 0.012 1.17 0.86
Discretion 2.71 0.79 3.43 0.014 1.00 1.00
Commitment 1.90 0.87 2.17 0.019 1.84 0.54
Restricted 
Commitment
2.56 0.91 2.82 0.028 1.22 0.82
Discretion 1.79 1.56 1.14 0.034 1.00 1.00
Commitment 1.59 1.09 1.46 0.025 1.91 0.52
Restricted 
Commitment
2.14 1.27 1.69 0.039 1.20 0.83
Discretion 1.34 1.95 0.69 0.047 1.00 1.00
Commitment 1.60 0.18 8.71 0.003 1.18 0.85
Restricted 
Commitment
1.76 0.10 16.91 0.003 1.06 0.94
Discretion 1.68 0.24 6.87 0.003 1.00 1.00
Commitment 1.36 0.41 3.35 0.007 1.43 0.70
Restricted 
Commitment
1.65 0.29 5.64 0.009 1.14 0.88
Discretion 1.45 0.63 2.29 0.010 1.00 1.00
Commitment 1.22 0.56 2.19 0.011 1.59 0.63
Restricted 
Commitment
1.55 0.46 3.38 0.014 1.18 0.85
Discretion 1.27 0.93 1.37 0.017 1.00 1.00
0.3
0.5
Unconditional Moments, and Value of the Loss Function: Different Output 
Elasticities of Marginal Cost (Kappa), with rho = 0.6
Table 3
(1) Calculated as the weighted sum of the unconditional variances of output and inflation rate in percentage
units.
Notes: The annualized standard deviation of the random cost-push shock is assumed to be 1%. The output is










































Commitment 6.41 2.37 2.71 0.097 1.88 0.53
Restricted 
Commitment
7.72 2.66 2.90 0.130 1.40 0.71
Discretion 4.02 4.08 0.98 0.183 1.00 1.00
Commitment 3.80 3.17 1.20 0.144 1.66 0.60
Restricted 
Commitment
4.24 3.75 1.13 0.195 1.23 0.81
Discretion 1.62 4.81 0.34 0.239 1.00 1.00
Commitment 2.89 3.52 0.82 0.166 1.54 0.65
Restricted 
Commitment
2.99 4.18 0.71 0.220 1.16 0.86
Discretion 1.01 4.99 0.20 0.254 1.00 1.00
Commitment 11.50 3.98 2.89 0.290 1.93 0.52
Restricted 
Commitment
13.29 4.31 3.09 0.362 1.55 0.64
Discretion 7.13 7.15 1.00 0.562 1.00 1.00
Commitment 7.21 5.43 1.33 0.451 1.79 0.56
Restricted 
Commitment
8.22 6.10 1.35 0.575 1.40 0.71
Discretion 3.18 8.80 0.36 0.805 1.00 1.00
Commitment 5.63 6.10 0.92 0.531 1.67 0.60
Restricted 
Commitment
6.24 6.94 0.90 0.677 1.31 0.76
Discretion 2.07 9.31 0.22 0.888 1.00 1.00
(1) Calculated as the weighted sum of the unconditional variances of output and inflation rate in percentage
units.
Notes: The annualized standard deviation of the random cost-push shock is assumed to be 1%. The output is









Unconditional Moments, and Value of the Loss Function: Different Share of 




































Commitment 7.08 1.50 4.71 0.073 1.63 0.61
Restricted 
Commitment
7.78 1.48 5.24 0.083 1.44 0.70
Discretion 6.52 2.76 2.37 0.119 1.00 1.00
Commitment 5.36 2.46 2.18 0.147 1.88 0.53
Restricted 
Commitment
6.09 2.53 2.41 0.176 1.57 0.64
Discretion 4.39 4.67 0.94 0.276 1.00 1.00
Commitment 4.58 3.01 1.52 0.196 1.96 0.51
Restricted 
Commitment
5.29 3.16 1.67 0.240 1.60 0.62
Discretion 3.46 5.69 0.61 0.384 1.00 1.00
Table 5
Unconditional Moments, and Value of the Loss Function: Degree of Inflation 
Persistence (Gamma Backwards) = 0.4, with rho = 0.6
Notes: The annualized standard deviation of the random cost-push shock is assumed to be 1%. The output is
measured in percentage deviations from the steady-state value, and the inflation rate is measured in
annualized percentage points.





 510.1 0.3 0.5
No Inflation Persistence 1.00 3.00 5.00
Inflation Persistence, omega = 0.25 0.92 2.71 4.49
Inflation Persistence, omega = 0.5 0.78 2.15 3.49





 52Figure 1 Ratios of the Value of the Loss as a Function of  (Relative Output
Weight in the Objective Function)
Figure 2 Ratios of the Value of the Loss as a Function of  (Autoregressive
Coefficient of the Cost-Push Shock Process)
53Figure 3 Unconditional Standard Deviation of Inflation Rate as a Function of 
(Relative Output Weight in the Objective Function)
Figure 4 Unconditional Standard Deviation of Output Gap as a Function of 
(Relative Output Weight in the Objective Function)
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.Figure 6 Ratios of the Value of the Loss as a Function of  (Degree of Price
Rigidity)
56Figure 7 Impulse Responses to a One-Percentage-Point Cost-Push Shock, with
  0
57Figure 8 Impulse Responses to a One-Percentage-Point Cost-Push Shock, with
  0.6
58Figure 9 Ratios of the Value of the Loss as a Function of b (Degree of
Inflation Persistence)
59Figure 10 Impulse Responses to a One-Percentage-Point Cost-Push Shock,
with Inflation Persistence (  0.25)
60Figure 11  Inflationary Bias: Inflation Rate and Output Gap as a Function of 
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 61Figure 12 Inflationary Bias as a Function of b (Degree of Inflation
Persistence)
62Figure 13 Ratios of the Value of the Total Loss and of the Dynamic Loss
Under Discretion to Those Under Commitment as a Function of b (Degree of
Inflation Persistence)
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,ODQ*ROGIDMQDQG6pUJLR5LEHLURGD&RVWD:HUODQJ

Jul/2000 
 2SWLPDO,QWHUHVW5DWH5XOHVLQ,QIODWLRQ7DUJHWLQJ)UDPHZRUNV
-RVp$OYDUR5RGULJXHV1HWR)DELR$UD~MRDQG0DUWD%DOWDU-0RUHLUD

Jul/2000 
 /HDGLQJ,QGLFDWRUVRI,QIODWLRQIRU%UD]LO
0DUFHOOH&KDXYHW

Set/2000 
 7KH&RUUHODWLRQ0DWUL[RIWKH%UD]LOLDQ&HQWUDO%DQN¶V6WDQGDUG
0RGHOIRU,QWHUHVW5DWH0DUNHW5LVN
-RVp$OYDUR5RGULJXHV1HWR

Set/2000 
 (VWLPDWLQJ([FKDQJH0DUNHW3UHVVXUHDQG,QWHUYHQWLRQ$FWLYLW\
(PDQXHO:HUQHU.RKOVFKHHQ

Nov/2000 
 $QiOLVHGR)LQDQFLDPHQWR([WHUQRD8PD3HTXHQD(FRQRPLD
&DUORV+DPLOWRQ9DVFRQFHORV$UD~MRH5HQDWR*DOYmR)O{UHV-~QLRU

Mar/2001 
 $1RWHRQWKH(IILFLHQW(VWLPDWLRQRI,QIODWLRQLQ%UD]LO
0LFKDHO)%U\DQDQG6WHSKHQ*&HFFKHWWL

Mar/2001 
 $7HVWRI&RPSHWLWLRQLQ%UD]LOLDQ%DQNLQJ
0iUFLR,1DNDQH

Mar/2001 
 0RGHORVGH3UHYLVmRGH,QVROYrQFLD%DQFiULDQR%UDVLO
0DUFLR0DJDOKmHV-DQRW

Mar/2001  65
 (YDOXDWLQJ&RUH,QIODWLRQ0HDVXUHVIRU%UD]LO
)UDQFLVFR0DUFRV5RGULJXHV)LJXHLUHGR

Mar/2001 
 ,V,W:RUWK7UDFNLQJ'ROODU5HDO,PSOLHG9RODWLOLW\"
6DQGUR&DQHVVRGH$QGUDGHDQG%HQMDPLQ0LUDQGD7DEDN

Mar/2001 
 $YDOLDomRGDV3URMHo}HVGR0RGHOR(VWUXWXUDOGR%DQFR&HQWUDOGR
%UDVLO3DUDD7D[DGH9DULDomRGR,3&$
6HUJLR$IRQVR/DJR$OYHV

Mar/2001 
 
 
 (YDOXDWLRQRIWKH&HQWUDO%DQNRI%UD]LO6WUXFWXUDO0RGHO¶V,QIODWLRQ
)RUHFDVWVLQDQ,QIODWLRQ7DUJHWLQJ)UDPHZRUN
6HUJLR$IRQVR/DJR$OYHV

Jul/2001 
 (VWLPDQGRR3URGXWR3RWHQFLDO%UDVLOHLUR8PD$ERUGDJHPGH)XQomR
GH3URGXomR
7LWR1tFLDV7HL[HLUDGD6LOYD)LOKR

Abr/2001 
 $6LPSOH0RGHOIRU,QIODWLRQ7DUJHWLQJLQ%UD]LO
3DXOR6SULQJHUGH)UHLWDVDQG0DUFHOR.IRXU\0XLQKRV

Abr/2001 
 8QFRYHUHG,QWHUHVW3DULW\ZLWK)XQGDPHQWDOV$%UD]LOLDQ([FKDQJH
5DWH)RUHFDVW0RGHO
0DUFHOR.IRXU\0XLQKRV3DXOR6SULQJHUGH)UHLWDVDQG)DELR$UD~MR

Maio/2001 
 &UHGLW&KDQQHOZLWKRXWWKH/0&XUYH
9LFWRULR<7&KXDQG0iUFLR,1DNDQH

Maio/2001 
 2V,PSDFWRV(FRQ{PLFRVGD&30)7HRULDH(YLGrQFLD
3HGUR+$OEXTXHUTXH

Jun/2001 
 'HFHQWUDOL]HG3RUWIROLR0DQDJHPHQW
3DXOR&RXWLQKRDQG%HQMDPLQ0LUDQGD7DEDN

Jun/2001 
 2V(IHLWRVGD&30)VREUHD,QWHUPHGLDomR)LQDQFHLUD
6pUJLR0LNLR.R\DPDH0iUFLR,1DNDQH

Jul/2001 
 ,QIODWLRQ7DUJHWLQJLQ%UD]LO6KRFNV%DFNZDUG/RRNLQJ3ULFHVDQG
,0)&RQGLWLRQDOLW\
-RHO%RJGDQVNL3DXOR6SULQJHUGH)UHLWDV,ODQ*ROGIDMQDQG
$OH[DQGUH$QWRQLR7RPELQL

Ago/2001 
 ,QIODWLRQ7DUJHWLQJLQ%UD]LO5HYLHZLQJ7ZR<HDUVRI0RQHWDU\3ROLF\

3HGUR)DFKDGD

Ago/2001 
 ,QIODWLRQ7DUJHWLQJLQDQ2SHQ)LQDQFLDOO\,QWHJUDWHG(PHUJLQJ
(FRQRP\WKHFDVHRI%UD]LO
0DUFHOR.IRXU\0XLQKRV

Ago/2001 


&RPSOHPHQWDULGDGHH)XQJLELOLGDGHGRV)OX[RVGH&DSLWDLV
,QWHUQDFLRQDLV
&DUORV+DPLOWRQ9DVFRQFHORV$UD~MRH5HQDWR*DOYmR)O{UHV-~QLRU

Set/2001 


5HJUDV0RQHWiULDVH'LQkPLFD0DFURHFRQ{PLFDQR%UDVLO8PD
$ERUGDJHPGH([SHFWDWLYDV5DFLRQDLV
0DUFR$QWRQLR%RQRPRH5LFDUGR'%ULWR

Nov/2001  66
 8VLQJD0RQH\'HPDQG0RGHOWR(YDOXDWH0RQHWDU\3ROLFLHVLQ%UD]LO
3HGUR+$OEXTXHUTXHDQG6RODQJH*RXYrD

Nov/2001 
 7HVWLQJWKH([SHFWDWLRQV+\SRWKHVLVLQWKH%UD]LOLDQ7HUP6WUXFWXUHRI
,QWHUHVW5DWHV
%HQMDPLQ0LUDQGD7DEDNDQG6DQGUR&DQHVVRGH$QGUDGH

Nov/2001 
 $OJXPDV&RQVLGHUDo}HV6REUHD6D]RQDOLGDGHQR,3&$
)UDQFLVFR0DUFRV5)LJXHLUHGRH5REHUWD%ODVV6WDXE

Nov/2001 
 &ULVHV&DPELDLVH$WDTXHV(VSHFXODWLYRVQR%UDVLO
0DXUR&RVWD0LUDQGD

Nov/2001 
 0RQHWDU\3ROLF\DQG,QIODWLRQLQ%UD]LOD9$5(VWLPDWLRQ
$QGUp0LQHOOD

Nov/2001 
 &RQVWUDLQHG'LVFUHWLRQDQG&ROOHFWLYH$FWLRQ3UREOHPV5HIOHFWLRQVRQ
WKH5HVROXWLRQRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO)LQDQFLDO&ULVHV
$UPLQLR)UDJDDQG'DQLHO/XL]*OHL]HU

Nov/2001 
 8PD'HILQLomR2SHUDFLRQDOGH(VWDELOLGDGHGH3UHoRV
7LWR1tFLDV7HL[HLUDGD6LOYD)LOKR

Dez/2001 
 &DQ(PHUJLQJ0DUNHWV)ORDW"6KRXOG7KH\,QIODWLRQ7DUJHW"
%DUU\(LFKHQJUHHQ

Fev/2002 
 0RQHWDU\3ROLF\LQ%UD]LO5HPDUNVRQWKH,QIODWLRQ7DUJHWLQJ5HJLPH
3XEOLF'HEW0DQDJHPHQWDQG2SHQ0DUNHW2SHUDWLRQV
/XL])HUQDQGR)LJXHLUHGR3HGUR)DFKDGDDQG6pUJLR*ROGHQVWHLQ

Mar/2002 
 9RODWLOLGDGH,PSOtFLWDH$QWHFLSDomRGH(YHQWRVGH6WUHVVXP7HVWH
SDUDR0HUFDGR%UDVLOHLUR
)UHGHULFR3HFKLU*RPHV

Mar/2002 
 2So}HVVREUH'yODU&RPHUFLDOH([SHFWDWLYDVD5HVSHLWRGR
&RPSRUWDPHQWRGD7D[DGH&kPELR
3DXOR&DVWRUGH&DVWUR

Mar/2002 
 6SHFXODWLYH$WWDFNVRQ'HEWV'ROODUL]DWLRQDQG2SWLPXP&XUUHQF\
$UHDV
$ORLVLR$UDXMRDQG0iUFLD/HRQ

Abr/2002 
 0XGDQoDVGH5HJLPHQR&kPELR%UDVLOHLUR
&DUORV+DPLOWRQ9$UD~MRH*HW~OLR%GD6LOYHLUD)LOKR

Jun/2002 
 0RGHOR(VWUXWXUDOFRP6HWRU([WHUQR(QGRJHQL]DomRGR3UrPLRGH
5LVFRHGR&kPELR
0DUFHOR.IRXU\0XLQKRV6pUJLR$IRQVR/DJR$OYHVH*LO5LHOOD

Jun/2002 
 7KH(IIHFWVRIWKH%UD]LOLDQ$'5V3URJUDPRQ'RPHVWLF0DUNHW
(IILFLHQF\
%HQMDPLQ0LUDQGD7DEDNDQG(GXDUGR-RVp$UD~MR/LPD
 
Jun/2002 
 (VWUXWXUD&RPSHWLWLYD3URGXWLYLGDGH,QGXVWULDOH/LEHUDomR
&RPHUFLDOQR%UDVLO 
3HGUR&DYDOFDQWL)HUUHLUDH2VPDQL7HL[HLUDGH&DUYDOKR*XLOOpQ 

Jun/2002 
 